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Abstract 
A proposed Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD) is evaluated against the traditional 
Attitude Indicator (AI).  To understand the merit of this research, U.S. Air Force Class A 
spatial disorientation (SD) mishaps over the past 21 years were analyzed.  This analysis 
applied Human Factors Analysis and Classification System codes to determine mishaps 
involving SD.  This data was combined with data from the Reliability and Maintainability 
Information System to determine accident rates per flight hour. Seventy-two SD mishaps 
were analyzed, resulting in the loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft since fiscal year (FY) 
1993 for a total cost of $2.32 billion. Results indicate that future SD research should be 
focused on fighter/attack and helicopter platforms.  With these results as the motivation, 
the graphical portions of the ASD were compared to the AI through a desktop flight 
simulation experiment in which participants used each display to recover from unusual 
attitudes. Participants completed recovery tasks approximately 2 seconds faster with the 
AI, on average. This time difference was greatest for participants having flight 
experience. Survey responses revealed that certain ASD design choices could be 
beneficial.  Further investigation of the ASD is recommended as are updates to the Air 
Force safety center database. 
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SPATIAL DISORIENTATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
 Since the advent of air travel, aircraft pilots have experienced Spatial 
Disorientation (SD), in which the pilot’s perception of aircraft position, motion, or 
attitude does not correspond to reality [1]. When suffering from SD, pilots naturally tend 
to make aircraft inputs and controls that may create safe flight in their perceived 
orientation, but result in unsafe flight in reality. These inputs often cause the aircraft to 
enter unusual attitudes which may include unperceived inversions, steep climbs, and 
sharp dives. These unusual attitudes brought on by SD thus immensely increase the risk 
of a mishap. Across the U.S. Air Force, SD mishaps are both prevalent and costly. In fact, 
SD was implicated in 20.2% of Air Force Class A mishaps between the years 1991 and 
2000. These 20.2% cost the Air Force $1.4B and claimed 60 lives [2]. 
 Pilots often use displays and instruments in the cockpit to determine their 
orientation when a view of the outside world is degraded by weather, darkness, or a 
perceived visual illusion. Particularly when suffering from SD, pilots are instructed to 
focus only on their instruments to discern their aircraft’s attitude. The first 
instrumentation to combat SD was an attitude indicator (AI) known as the Sperry 
Horizon, originally developed in 1928 by Elmer Sperry Jr. of the Sperry Corporation [3]. 
Since that time, despite some known human factors and training issues, this attitude 
instrument and display has become standard in most instrumented aircraft cockpits [4] 
and is generally replicated in electronic form within even the most modern American 
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aircraft cockpits.  However, this instrument may not effectively combat spatial 
disorientation since mishaps involving spatial disorientation continue to occur across all 
forms of flight [2]. 
Problem Statement 
 SD is a problem that is not fully understood at this time. An in-depth review of 
past major SD mishaps must be performed to better understand and unfold the 
phenomenon, in terms of the factors that are highly correlated with SD mishaps. 
Additionally, potential paths forward must be scientifically analyzed to determine their 
utility in mitigating or minimizing the effects of SD. Specifically, a newly proposed 
attitude display, the Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD) which differs from the current 
AI in several significant ways, will be analyzed with regard to its utility in SD 
mitigation/avoidance. 
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
1) How prevalent is SD, in terms of the frequency of Class A mishaps per flight 
 hour across the Air Force? 
2) How costly is SD, in terms of financial cost, human lives lost, and aircraft  
 destroyed? 
3) What factors are correlated with SD mishaps? 
 a) Do certain aircraft types have a significantly higher rate of    
  SD mishaps per flight hour? 
 b) Does a higher rate of SD mishaps per flight hour occur during the   
  day or at night? 
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 c) Does fatigue play a role in the incidence of SD mishaps? 
4) How does the proposed ASD compare to the traditional AI in terms   
 of learnability/transfer-of-training, pilot preference, and speed and accuracy of 
 response to SD?  
 a) Learnability/transfer-of-training - Will inexperienced    
  participants achieve better/faster performance with the ASD than   
  with the traditional AI? Will experienced pilots perform as well   
  with the ASD as they do with the AI, given their years of    
  experience with the AI? 
 b) Pilot Preference - Will participants of all experience levels indicate  
  higher preference of ASD or the traditional AI? Which aspects of  
  ASD will they most like/dislike? 
 c)  Speed of Response to SD - Will participants using     
  ASD complete recovery more rapidly than pilots using the    
  traditional AI? 
 d) Accuracy of Response to SD - Will pilots using ASD commit   
  fewer control reversals when recovering from UAs than    
  pilots using the traditional AI? Will pilots using ASD    
  recoverfrom unusual attitudes (UAs) more accurately (i.e. closer to  
  perfectly) than pilots using the traditional AI? 
5) How can the information learned from ASD contribute to the general body of 
 knowledge of attitude displays? 
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Research Focus 
 This research effort was divided into two parts. The first was focused on an 
analysis of U.S. Air Force SD aviation mishaps. Specifically, its purpose was to 
determine the prevalence and impact of past mishaps, the environmental conditions in 
which they are more likely to occur, the types of aircraft most likely to be involved, and 
the impact of crew size.  Although many of these factors have been addressed in the 
previous literature, the current study relied on HFACS nanocodes for indicating mishaps 
involving SD and combined safety data with reliability data to permit the mishap rate to 
be computed as a function of flight hours. 
 The second part sought to understand a new attitude display that has been 
proposed by Pilot Disorientation Prevention Technologies (PDPT). The proposed ASD 
aims to minimize and mitigate the risks and effects of SD. The ASD differs in three 
significant fashions from the Sperry-style AI. First, it draws the pilot’s attention by way 
of an auditory alarm when it determines that SD may be setting in. Second, the display 
employs a potentially more intuitive (moving-aircraft, stationary-horizon) graphical 
interface to aid pilots in determining their attitude. Finally, the ASD provides a specific, 
recommended course of action to aid the pilot in rapid recovery. While each of these 
differences is intended to improve to the Sperry-style AI, the second part of this research 
focused on comparing the graphical depiction in the ASD to the traditional AI. 
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Investigative Questions 
1) What will be participants’ average time to complete recovery for each display? 
2) What will be participant’s average RMS error from perfect recovery for each 
 display? 
3) How many control errors will participants make with each display, on average? 
Methodology 
 Data was obtained from the United States Air Force Safety Center’s, Air Force 
Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for the 21 years from fiscal years 1993 through 2013 
using the integrated Data Extraction Tool.  Mishaps were categorized as SD or non-SD 
using HFACS. Air Force flying time distributions over the same time period were 
gathered from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS). This 
data was applied to normalize the mishap data from AFSAS to determine incident rates 
per million flight hours for each of several potential predictor variables.  
 A desktop computer based, non-moving flight simulator was used to compare the 
graphical depiction of the ASD to the traditional AI. Participants were selected from all 
flight experience levels and were asked to recover from already in-progress unusual 
attitudes in the flight simulation. Metrics such as the number of control errors, the time to 
complete recovery, and the root mean square error from perfect recovery were collected.  
Assumptions/Limitations 
1)  The analysis of past mishaps was limited by inconsistent reporting of SD mishaps 
 and a lack of accessibility to AF flying time distributions categorized by location. 
 It assumed that categorization of SD mishaps in AFSAS was completely accurate 
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 and that data from AFSAS and REMIS encapsulated all AF mishaps and flight 
 time. 
2) The attitude display experiment was limited by the use of a non-moving desktop 
 flight simulator, by a small sample size, and by a difficulty in recruiting novice 
 participants. It assumed that participants put forth their best effort with both 
 displays and that participants could not predict the scenarios they would 
 encounter. 
Implications 
 SD costs the AF over a billion dollars per decade. In addition to being extremely 
expensive, SD is poorly understood and often fatal. This thesis research hopes to make 
strides in achieving better comprehension of SD by determining which conditions have 
been highly correlated with SD occurrence. Furthermore, it aims to contribute to the body 
of knowledge of attitude displays which may inhibit or mitigate the effects of SD. Using 
the knowledge gained through this research, aviation communities worldwide could 
benefit from saving countless dollars, aircraft, and lives. 
Preview 
 Chapter II of this manuscript is a scholarly article detailing the analysis of past 
Air Force SD mishaps and serves as motivation for SD mitigation research. As an 
example of this type of research, Chapter III is a scholarly article detailing the experiment 
which compares the newly proposed ASD and the traditional AI. Chapter IV provides 
general conclusions and recommends future research in this field of study. 
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Abstract 
 Background:  Spatial disorientation is a significant factor in a large percentage of 
military Class A aviation mishaps.  While previous studies analyzed accident statistics, 
they often suffer from methodological flaws which lead to questionable conclusions. 
Methods: The current study relied upon the Air Force Safety Automated System to 
document U.S. Air Force Class A mishap investigations during the past 21 years.  Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System codes were used to determine mishaps 
involving pilot spatial disorientation.  This data was combined with data from the 
Reliability and Maintainability Information System to determine the accident rate per 
flight hour.    Results: Seventy-two spatial disorientation (SD) mishaps were analyzed 
resulting in loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft since fiscal year (FY) 1993 for a total cost of 
$2.32 billion. Class A mishaps involving spatial disorientation had a higher odds ratio as 
a function of hours flown for helicopter and fighter/attack fixed wing aircraft than for 
other aircraft.  Additionally, odds ratios for F-15 and single seat fighter/attack aircraft 
were only marginally larger than for other fighter/attack aircraft.  Although SD mishaps 
at night had similar odds ratios to daytime SD mishaps when normalized by flight hours, 
SD mishaps account for a larger percent of the total Class A mishaps during the night 
than during the day.  Discussion:   SD mishaps were analyzed in terms of Class A 
mishaps per million flight hours.  Results indicate that future SD research should be 
focused on fighter/attack and helicopter platforms.  Updates to the Air Force safety center 
database are recommended. 
 
Keywords:  Aircraft Mishaps, Situation Awareness, HFACS 
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Introduction 
 Since the advent of air travel, aircraft pilots have experienced Spatial 
Disorientation (SD), in which the pilot’s perception of aircraft position, motion, or 
attitude does not correspond to reality [1]. Several previous research studies have shown 
that mishaps involving SD are very uncommon (as low as 0.5% of all mishaps) [2] while 
others have claimed that SD accidents are highly underreported [3]. Because of a 
burgeoning understanding of the phenomenon, SD reporting procedures are not 
standardized throughout aviation, across the United States Department of Defense or 
even within branches of the U.S. military. As the costs and dangers associated with SD 
have been uncovered, research has expanded to facilitate more accurate classification of 
SD mishaps [4].  
 The ability of humans to perceive their three-dimensional orientation in space is 
rooted in our ability to accurately interpret various sensory inputs. These inputs come 
mainly from the eyes, the vestibular system located in the inner ear, and the haptic nerves 
of the skin [5]. In the typical human environment (i.e. standing or sitting on the surface of 
Earth) the sensations provided by these sources are almost always adequate. They 
provide a stable frame of reference from which we can detect movement and motion in 
three dimensions [5]. However, once a human being leaves the surface of Earth, enters 
into flight and experiences forces other than gravity, these sensory organs do not always 
perform in a desirable manner. Thankfully, confusing vestibular or proprioceptive signals 
are nearly always overridden by visual input as pilots can usually determine their 
orientation with respect to Earth based upon ground reference information.  However, 
when visibility is limited in poor weather or at night, pilots must use an attitude indicator 
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in coordination with other instruments in the cockpit to determine their orientation. This 
action requires cognitive effort on the part of the pilot [6]. This effort is necessary 
because unlike interpreting typical orientation cues on the ground, the pilot does not have 
decades of experience interpreting cues from airborne artificial displays.  
 While several studies have analyzed historical aircraft mishaps in an attempt to 
understand the factors contributing to SD, these studies often suffer from the lack of data 
to provide convincing results.  For example, as indicated by Sundstrom, to understand 
accident rates as a function of aircraft type or weather condition, one must normalize the 
number of accidents by the number of flight hours within the corresponding conditions 
[7].  This data is rarely available and is not typically captured within safety databases.  
Therefore, previous research often applied proxies for flight hours.   Lyons and 
colleagues normalized the number of United States Air Force Mishaps from 1990 through 
2004 by the number of sorties flown [8].  While the number of sorties is a reasonable 
proxy for flight hours within a given aircraft platform, the use of this metric will skew 
results when comparing across platforms since helicopter, fixed-wing fighter/attack 
aircraft, and bomber or transport aircraft can vary greatly in sortie duration.  Other 
common errors present in the literature include relying on poorly classified information 
for identifying accidents involving spatial disorientation or misclassification of aircraft 
attributes. 
 Earlier research has illuminated many of these issues, leading to improvement in 
mishap databases and mishap classification.  For example, the adoption of Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) has provided a more reliable 
method for classifying aircraft mishaps [9].  This classification scheme has been adopted 
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across much of the United States aviation community, permitting more reliable 
classification and sorting of mishaps. 
 The current research effort was focused on an analysis of U.S. Air Force SD 
aviation mishaps. Specifically, its purpose was to determine the prevalence and impact of 
past mishaps, the environmental conditions in which they are more likely to occur, the 
types of aircraft most likely to be involved, and the impact of crew size.  Although many 
of these factors have been addressed in the previous literature, the current study relied on 
HFACS nanocodes for indicating mishaps involving SD and combined safety data with 
reliability data to permit the mishap rate to be computed as a function of flight hours. 
Method 
 Data was obtained from the United States Air Force Safety Center’s, Air Force 
Safety Automated System (AFSAS) for the 21 years from fiscal years 1993 through 2013 
using the integrated Data Extraction Tool (DET).  This tool permitted relevant 
information for Class A mishaps within this interval to be exported for further analysis in 
Microsoft Excel and JMP 10.  The resulting database included data on every U.S. Air 
Force Class A SD mishap, where a Class A mishap is defined as a mishap resulting in 
more than two million dollars in damages or a loss of life [10].  
 SD mishaps were defined as any mishap that references an SD nanocode in 
HFACS. This system allows the safety investigation board (SIB) to classify mishaps 
based on their causal factors and major contributors.  A reference to an HFACS SD 
nanocode indicates that the mishap in question involved SD.  While these nanocodes are 
assigned by various individuals and it is possible that the threshold for considering SD as 
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a major contributor will likely vary with the person assigning the nanocode, the use of 
this standardized method should be more reliable than the use of other methods, including 
the “one-liners” as reported in some previous research [6].  
 Air Force flying time distributions over the same time period (fiscal years 1993 
through 2013) were gathered from the Reliability and Maintainability Information 
System (REMIS). This data was applied to normalize the mishap data from AFSAS to 
determine incident rates per million flight hours for each of several potential predictor 
variables. The number of mishaps associated with each variable was normalized by the 
number of flight hours associated with each variable. Comparison of these incidence rates 
created rate ratios which indicate the proportion of incident rates between two predictor 
variables.   The Pearson Chi-Square test was then applied in JMP 10 to determine the 
statistical significance of any differences. 
Results 
A total of 601 Class A mishaps were identified for analysis, including 72 Class A 
mishaps involving SD.  During the analysis period, Air Force aircraft logged more than 
44 million hours of flight.  Therefore, 13.5 Class A mishaps occurred per million hours of 
flight with 1.6 of these accidents involving SD.  The SD-related mishaps resulted in the 
loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft for a total monetary cost of $2.32 billion. Irrelevant of 
SD, the 601 total Class A mishaps resulted in the loss of 406 lives, 368 aircraft and a 
monetary cost of $13.04 billion. This shows that while SD Class A mishaps only account 
for 12.0% of the total number of Class A mishaps, they account for 17.7% of the lost 
aircraft, 17.8% of the cost, and a staggering 24.9% of the lives lost as the SD mishaps 
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produced 34.1% of the fatal mishaps. Interestingly, 16.1% (85) of the non-SD mishaps 
resulted in a fatality, 61.1% (44) of the SD-related mishaps resulted in a fatality. These 
calculations are consolidated in Table 1, below. These findings are supported by Gibb 
and colleagues who claimed that SD is the leading cause of pilot fatalities [3].    
Table 1(II).  Comparison of Air Force Losses from SD Class A Mishaps to all Class A 
Mishaps. 
 
 Total Mishaps 
(#) 
Fatal Mishaps % 
(#) 
Lives Lost Aircraft 
Lost 
Cost ($B) 
SD 72 61.1(44) 101 65 2.32 
Total  601          (129) 406 368 13.04 
Proportion 12.0% 34.1% 24.9% 17.7% 17.8% 
 
 Using the information in Table 1, an odds ratio indicated that the odds of a fatality 
are 8.21 times higher in a Class A mishap involving SD than in a non-SD mishap (χ2(1, 
N=601) = 76.28, p≤0.0001)).   Thus, major accidents caused by SD are more likely to 
result in death than those caused by other factors. 
Aircraft Type 
This analysis included a number of aircraft models and classes to include single and dual-
seat Fighter/Attack, Trainers, Transport, Bombers, and Helicopters, among others, as 
shown in Table 2. 
Table 2(II).  Aircraft Flight Hours and Mishap Rates. 
 
Aircraft Flight Hours (M) SD Mishap Rate 
(#SD Mishaps) 
Fatality Rate  
(#Fatal SD Mishaps) 
Single Seat F/A    
     A-10 2.35 3.83(9) 2.56(6) 
     F-15 A/C 1.96 1.02(2) 0(0) 
     F-16 A/C 5.78 3.46(20) 2.42(14) 
     F-117 
     F-22 
0.19 
0.16 
5.32(1) 
6.30(1) 
5.32(1) 
6.30(1) 
Two-Seat Fighter    
     F-15 B/D/E 1.56 2.56(4) 1.92(3) 
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     F-16 B/D 1.00 5.00(5) 4.00(4) 
     F-4 0.095 10.55(1) 0(0) 
Trainer    
     T-3 0.083 12.02(1) 12.02(1) 
     T-6 1.47 0.68(1) 0.68(1) 
     T-37 2.40 0.42(1) 0(0) 
     T-38 2.81 0.71(2) 0.36(1) 
Transport    
     C-5 1.25 0.80(1) 0(0) 
     C-17 2.46 0.81(2) 0(0) 
     C-141 1.20 0.83(1) 0.83(1) 
     CV-22 
     C-12 
0.031 
0.44 
32.09(1) 
2.25(1) 
32.09(1) 
2.25(1) 
Bomber    
     B-1 0.52 3.87(2) 1.94(1) 
     B-52 0.50 2.00(1) 2.00(1) 
Helicopter    
     H-60 0.55 12.77(7) 7.30(4) 
     H-53 0.18 5.47(1) 5.47(1) 
     H-1 0.50 4.02(2) 0(0) 
Other    
     E-8 0.16 6.37(1) 0(0) 
     U-2 
     U-28 
0.25 
UNK 
12.05(3) 
UNK(1) 
4.02(1) 
UNK(1) 
 
In terms of aircraft type, 59.7% (43) of the SD mishaps involved aircraft with 
fighter/attack (F/A) designations. However, only 55.2% (292) of the non-SD mishaps 
involved F/A aircraft. Therefore, the odds of a Class A mishap involving SD are 1.20 
times higher for F/A aircraft than all other aircraft, though this rate was not statistically 
significant (χ2(1, N=601) = 0.53, p=0.47)).   However, once the mishaps are normalized 
by flight hours, the incidence of SD-related F/A aircraft Class A mishaps is found to be 
3.15 per million flight hours, while the same statistic for non-fighter/attack, fixed-wing 
aircraft is 0.61 SD-related Class A mishaps per million flight hours.  Therefore, the rate 
of SD-related Class A mishaps was found to be 5.15 times higher for F/A aircraft than for 
all other fixed-wing aircraft. These figures are presented in Table 3. 
 
15 
Table 3(II).  Incidence and rate ratios for fighter/attack and non-fighter/attack aircraft. 
 
 Flight 
Hours 
SD Mishaps Rate per 
Million 
Ratio (FA/non-FA) 
F/A 13.7M 43 3.15 5.15 
Non-F/A 29.4M 18 0.61  
 
In terms of aircraft type, 14.1% (10) of the SD mishaps involved helicopters 
(excluding the tilt-rotor CV-22), while only 7.4% (39) of non-SD mishaps involved 
helicopters.  Therefore, the odds of a Class A mishap involving SD are 2.05 times higher 
for helicopters than all other aircraft (χ2(1, N=598) = 3.716, p=0.054)). However, 
helicopters accounted for only 2.8% of the flight hours accrued within the sample as 
indicated by Figure 4. Once the mishap rate is calculated as a function of flight hours, a 
larger effect is observed. Helicopters incur 8.11 SD mishaps per million flight hours, 
while their fixed-wing counterparts incur only 1.42 SD mishaps per million flight hours. 
Thus, helicopters are involved in SD mishaps at 5.73 times the rate of fixed-wing aircraft.  
Like F/A aircraft, helicopters within the Air Force arsenal are more prone than the 
average aircraft to SD-related Class A mishaps. 
Table 4(II).  Incidence and rate ratios for Helicopter and Fixed-Wing aircraft. 
 
 Flight 
Hours 
SD Mishaps Rate per 
Million 
Ratio  
Helicopter 1.2M 10 8.11 5.73 
Fixed-Wing 43.1M 61 1.42  
 
 As shown in Table 2, the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon has been 
involved in 34.7% (25) of the Air Force SD-related mishaps, a relatively large proportion.  
However, all other F/A aircraft have been involved in 25% (18) of SD mishaps. Thus, 
this analysis would indicate that the F-16 is not significantly more likely than the all other 
F/A aircraft to experience SD-related Class A mishaps (χ2(1, N=335) = 0.001, p=0.974)).  
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After normalizing based on flight hours, the F-16 is involved in 3.69 SD-related Class A 
mishaps per million flight hours, which is 1.41 times the rate of 2.62 mishaps per million 
flight hours for all other F/A aircraft, as shown in Table 5.  
Table 5(II).  Incidence and rate ratios for F-16 and all other fighter/attack aircraft. 
 
 Flight Hours SD 
Mishaps 
Rate per 
Million 
Ratio  
(F-16/Other F/A) 
F-16 6.8M 25 3.69 1.41 
Other F/A 6.9M 18 2.62  
 
Single-Seat vs. Multi-Seat 
 Of the SD mishaps, 48.6% (35) of them involved a single-seat aircraft, as opposed 
to multi-seat fixed-wing aircraft. Of the non-SD mishaps, 50.5% (241) of them involved a 
single-seat aircraft. Thus, this analysis indicates that single-seat aircraft are not 
significantly more likely than the all other fixed-wing aircraft to experience SD-related 
Class A mishaps (χ2(1, N=552) = 1.82, p=0.18). It was also found that when limiting the 
analysis to only fighter/attack aircraft, single-seat F/A aircraft were no more likely than 
their multi-seat F/A counterparts to experience SD mishaps (χ2(1, N=335) = 0.091, 
p=0.76). This would seem to indicate that the aircraft crew size has no effect on the 
probability of an SD mishap. However, once the Air Force flying hour distributions are 
used to normalize the data, it is seen that the incidence rate per million flight hours is 
actually much higher for single-seat aircraft (3.28 incidents per million flight hours), than 
for multi-seat, fixed-wing aircraft (0.80 incidents per million flight hours). The associated 
rate ratio for single-seat to multi-seat, fixed-wing aircraft was 4.09, indicating that lone 
pilots suffer SD mishaps at over three times the rate of multi-person, fixed-wing aircrews. 
This data is consolidated in Table 6.  Since a great deal of the airframes fit into both the 
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single-seat and fighter/attack categories, a more appropriate comparison is single-seat 
fighter/attack aircraft to multi-seat fighter/attack aircraft.  As a result the rate per million 
flight hours is 3.28 for single-seat F/A aircraft, which is comparable to the 3.15 mishaps 
per million flight hours for multi-seat fighter/attack aircraft.  Therefore, when comparing 
single seat fighter/attack aircraft to multi-seat fighter/attack aircraft, having multiple seats 
does not appear to significantly reduce the incidence of Class A SD mishaps. 
Table 6(II).  Incidence and rate ratios for single-seat and multi-seat fixed-wing aircraft. 
 
 Flight 
Hours 
SD Mishaps Rate per 
Million 
Ratio  
(Single-Seat/Multi-Seat) 
Single-Seat 10.7M 35 3.28 4.09 
Multi-Seat 32.4M 26 0.80  
 
Time of Day 
 With regard to time of day, 52.8% (38) of SD-related Class A mishaps occurred 
during nighttime operations. By comparison, only 20.2% (107) of all Class A mishaps 
occurred at night, a significantly lower percent than observed for SD-related mishaps 
(χ2(1, N=601) = 36.68, p≤0.0001)). Under these conditions, the odds that a Class A 
mishap will involve SD are 4.41 times higher than non-SD mishaps. After normalizing 
the data by flight hours, the rate ratio of nighttime to daytime SD mishaps was calculated 
to be 1.16. Thus, SD mishaps occurred slightly more frequently at night than during the 
day.   However, when performing this same analysis for the non-SD mishaps, the ratio of 
nighttime to daytime mishaps was only 0.32, indicating that non-SD mishaps occur much 
more frequently during daytime.  These values are consolidated in Table 7, below. 
Regrettably, the collection and presentation of night vision goggle (NVG) use data in 
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AFSAS was inconsistent and incomplete, and a proper statistical analysis could not be 
performed.  
Table 7(II).  Incidence and rate ratios for Night and Day Mishaps. 
 
 Flight 
Hours 
SD Mishaps Rate per 
Million 
Ratio (Night/Day) 
Night 22.1M 38 1.72 1.16 
Day 22.3M 33 1.48  
 Flight 
Hours 
Class A Mishaps Rate per 
Million 
Ratio (Night/Day) 
Night 22.1M 145 6.56 0.32 
Day 22.3M 456 20.48  
 
Fatigue 
 In the area of fatigue, 13.9% (10) of the SD mishaps cited fatigue as a possible 
factor while only 5.7% (30) of non-SD mishaps cited fatigue as a possible factor.  An 
odds ratio analysis indicates that the odds of a mishap involving SD are 2.68 times higher 
when fatigue is a possible factor than when it is not (χ2(1, N=601) = 6.889, p=0.0087)).      
Discussion and Conclusions 
 Spatial disorientation has posed a significant problem to the U.S. Air Force since 
the advent of aviation and continues to do so today. SD mishaps have cost the Air Force 
more than 2 billion dollars and more than 100 lives over the past two decades. While SD-
related mishaps accounted for a relatively small number of the Class A mishaps, SD-
related mishaps are often catastrophic, being much more likely to result in loss of life, 
loss of aircraft, and larger than average monetary losses than the other Class A mishaps. 
SD-related mishaps account for 12% of the Class A mishaps but account for more than 
34% of the fatal mishaps, 25% of the lost lives, 17% of the lost aircraft and 17% of the 
monetary losses from Class A mishaps. 
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Aircraft type was found to have a significant effect upon the likelihood of an SD 
mishap.  Although one might hypothesize that pilots of large aircraft might be likely to 
experience SD due to slow aircraft movement (e.g., roll) which might be below the 
threshold of the human vestibular or proprioceptive systems [5], the data indicates that 
SD mishaps occur in fighter/attack aircraft or helicopters at more than 5 times the rate of 
non-fighter/attack, fixed-wing aircraft when the number of SD mishaps are calculated as 
a ratio of flight hours.  Although it was expected that normalizing the mishap rate by the 
number of flight hours rather than the number of sorties would yield different results, this 
observation is surprisingly similar to that of previous studies [8].  Therefore, it is 
probable that SD accidents are more likely to occur in the flight conditions present in the 
typical missions of these aircraft.  Unfortunately, this analysis did not clearly indicate a 
reason for this difference.  Many potential reasons for this difference could by 
hypothesized, including the likelihood of reduced decision times due to lower altitudes or 
faster flight, increased aircraft agility resulting in more aggressive maneuvers, or crew 
configuration.   
Regarding crew size among fixed-wing aircraft, it was found that single-seat 
aircraft incurred SD mishaps at over 4 times the rate of multi-seat aircraft. While this 
finding is impressive, it should be tempered by the knowledge that it is basically 
demonstrating the same effect of mission type as the fighter/attack trend.  Thus, when a 
crew size analysis was limited to F/A aircraft only, the single-seat SD mishap rate was 
only slightly higher than the multi-seat F/A aircraft mishap rate (3.28 versus 3.15 
mishaps per million flight hours).  This result does differ from the result provided by 
previous analyses of rate per sortie, which indicated that the mishap rate was slightly 
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higher for two-seat than single seat F/A aircraft [6].  Overall, and somewhat surprisingly, 
the data indicates that the second crew member provides minimal, if any, protection from 
Class A mishaps. 
The high-speed General Dynamics F-16 has been implicated as being overly 
vulnerable to SD [6].  While the F-16 did accrue the largest number of SD mishaps in this 
timeframe, normalizing mishaps by flight hours diminished the apparent effect. The 
analysis indicated that the F-16 incurred SD mishaps at 1.4 times the rate of all other 
fighter/attack aircraft. Since this difference was not statistically significant, it is not clear 
that F-16s are more vulnerable to SD than other fighter/attack aircraft. 
Perhaps one of the more interesting and difficult to interpret effects was the 
likelihood of SD mishaps in night as compared to day conditions.  It was expected that 
the rate of SD mishaps would be substantially larger at night than during the day as loss 
of visibility would be expected to increase the likelihood of SD.  However, the ratio of 
nighttime to daytime SD-related mishaps was 1.16, indicating that SD-related mishaps 
occur with only a modest increase in frequency at night as compared to day.  This result 
was unexpected as visual cues are greatly reduced at night as compared to day.  Also 
surprising, when comparing all mishaps, nighttime Class A mishaps are much less likely 
to occur than daytime Class A mishaps. The reason for this difference is unclear, but one 
possible explanation is that the missions flown at night are significantly less aggressive 
than the missions flown during the day and this difference in mission profile is 
confounded with the time of day.  Since the number of flight hours flown at night and 
during the day differs by about 16%, one can compare the ratio of SD-related mishaps to 
all Class A mishaps.  In this comparison, SD related mishaps account for 26.2 percent of 
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all Class A mishaps at night but only 7.2 percent during the day.  Therefore, it is possible 
that the likelihood of SD accidents at night is much greater than during the day for similar 
missions, but the databases do not provide enough detail to test this claim. 
 Unfortunately the database was not structured to permit the comparison of several 
factors of interest, including NVG use. Previous analysis of helicopter mishap reports 
found that SD mishaps involving NVGs occurred at nearly 9 times the rate of those 
during daytime flight [11]. This same study found accident records which indicated that 
62% of spatial disorientation mishaps occurred at night [11]. Quality decrements to the 
pilot’s visual input, such as NVG use may also limit the true visibility of the environment 
to the pilot. As such, previous literature would indicate that misperceptions and SD may 
be much more likely to occur in limited visibility conditions.  However, the database was 
not structured to reliably permit analysis of NVG use.  For similar reasons, it would have 
been desirable to understand the effect of weather conditions that reduced operator 
visibility on the occurrence of SD-related Class A mishaps. However, this comparison 
once again was not facilitated by the database.  The authors also sought to understand the 
impact of pilot experience level on the likelihood of SD-related Class A mishaps but were 
unable to reliably obtain the data necessary to facilitate this comparison from the existing 
database.  It would be desirable to structure the database to permit these comparisons in 
the future. 
 Overall, this study demonstrated that the normalization of mishap data by flight 
hours rather than number of flights can result in different interpretations of the existing 
mishap data.  Further, this study emphasizes the fact that Spatial Disorientation remains a 
significant issue for military aviation, especially for helicopter and fighter/attack aircraft.  
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Tenable explanations are that these aircraft may engage in more aggressive maneuvers, 
resulting in an increased incidence of spatial disorientation or that the proximity to earth 
and speed of these aircraft shorten pilot decision times, thus increasing the risk of a 
mishap as a result of the incidence of spatial disorientation.   Perhaps each of these 
factors contributes to the increase in mishaps among these aircraft.  Regardless of the 
reason for the increase in mishap rate, it is clear that future efforts to reduce SD mishaps 
should focus on these platforms as SD mishaps are 5 times more likely per flight hour in 
these aircraft than other aircraft.   
 It should be noted that helmet-mounted displays are being considered for 
incorporation into many fighter/attack aircraft as this technology is anticipated to increase 
the pilot’s situation awareness [12]. While this increase in situation awareness may 
potentially reduce SD, the ability of these devices to result in attention blindness or the 
potential removal of reference information (e.g., the airframe) may actually have a 
detrimental effect on the pilot’s awareness of spatial orientation.  Therefore, there is a 
need to update the safety system database to capture the use of these devices in addition 
to the use of NVGs to permit any effect of these technologies on SD mishaps to be 
evaluated in future studies.   
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Abstract 
Aviation mishaps involving spatial disorientation (SD) have cost the U.S. Air Force over 
$2B in the past two decades. A non-traditional attitude display, the attitude stabilization 
display (ASD) has been proposed which may alleviate concerns with the current attitude 
indicator (AI) and mitigate the risks of spatial disorientation. Participants used both the 
proposed and current designs to recover from unusual attitudes in a desktop flight 
simulation. Participants completed recovery tasks approximately 2 seconds faster with 
the AI, on average. There was a significant difference indicating that participants also 
found it easier to learn how to use the AI. There was a significant effect of flight 
experience on recovery time difference, with more experienced pilots performing better 
with the AI and less experienced pilots performing better with the ASD. Since the 
majority of participants already had experience with the AI, these results were expected. 
Survey responses revealed that certain ASD design choices could be beneficial in the 
cockpit. Since this study did not measure the full intent of the ASD, which is to aid the 
pilot during SD inception and avoid SD altogether, further investigation of the ASD is 
warranted. 
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Spatial Disorientation, Attitude Indicator, Human Factors, Flight Simulator 
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Introduction 
 Since the advent of air travel, aircraft pilots have experienced Spatial 
Disorientation (SD), in which the pilot’s perception of aircraft position, motion, or 
attitude does not correspond to reality [1]. When suffering from SD, pilots naturally tend 
to make aircraft inputs and controls that may create safe flight in their perceived 
orientation, but result in unsafe flight in reality. These inputs often cause the aircraft to 
enter unusual attitudes (UAs) which may include unperceived inversions, steep climbs, 
and sharp dives. These unusual attitudes brought on by SD thus immensely increase the 
risk of a mishap. Across the U.S. Air Force, SD mishaps are both prevalent and costly. In 
fact, 72 spatial disorientation (SD) Class A mishaps have occurred in the Air Force since 
fiscal year 1993 which resulted in the loss of 101 lives and 65 aircraft for a total cost of 
$2.32 billion [2]. 
 Pilots often use displays and instruments in the cockpit to determine their 
orientation when a view of the outside world is degraded by weather, darkness, or a 
perceived visual illusion. Particularly when suffering from SD, pilots are instructed to 
focus only on their instruments to discern their aircraft’s attitude. The first 
instrumentation to combat SD was an attitude indicator (AI) known as the Sperry 
Horizon, originally developed in 1928 by Elmer Sperry Jr. of the Sperry Corporation [3]. 
Since that time, despite some known human factors and training issues, this attitude 
instrument and display has become standard in most instrumented aircraft cockpits [4] 
and is generally replicated in electronic form within even the most modern American 
aircraft cockpits.  However, this instrument may not effectively combat spatial 
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disorientation since mishaps involving spatial disorientation continue to occur across all 
forms of flight [2]. 
 This research, seeks to understand the performance of a proposed attitude display. 
This proposed system is termed an Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD). The ASD 
differs in three significant fashions from the Sperry-style AI. First, it draws the pilot’s 
attention by way of an auditory alert when it determines that the aircraft is entering an 
unexpected attitude, indicating the potential onset of SD. Second, the display employs a 
potentially more intuitive graphical interface (explained later) to aid pilots in determining 
their attitude. Finally, the ASD provides a specific, recommended course of action to 
guide the pilot towards returning the aircraft to the expected attitude once it has detected 
the presence of the unexpected attitude. While each of these differences is intended to 
improve the Sperry-style AI, this research will focus on only the second intended 
improvement, comparing the graphical depiction in the ASD to the traditional AI.  
Literature Review 
Spatial Disorientation 
 SD is typically categorized based on the pilot’s response. Specifically, a pilot can 
recognize, not recognize, or become incapacitated by SD. Type I, or unrecognized, SD 
occurs when pilots do not realize that they are suffering from SD and fly the aircraft in an 
unintended attitude. Typically, Type I SD results in either a controlled flight into terrain 
(CFIT) or a transition to Type II SD. Recognized, or Type II, SD comes into existence 
when pilots recognize that they are spatially disoriented. At this stage, Type II SD 
typically results in a recovery and regaining of spatial orientation or a transition to Type 
29 
III SD.  If pilots are unable to handle the realization that they are suffering from SD and 
are thus unable to match their perception of motion, position, and attitude to reality (i.e. 
recover), this is classified as Type III SD, or incapacitating, SD [5].  
 Often, the vestibular system of the inner ear is to blame for SD episodes. The 
semicircular canals and otolith organs, which make up the vestibular system, are sensitive 
only to acceleration, not to sustained movement. Therefore, after sustaining a constant 
turn for approximately 10-15  seconds, an aircraft pilots’ vestibular organs begin to relay 
sensory signals which are consistent with straight and level flight, while the aircraft is 
continuing to turn [6]. Several other imperfections in the vestibular system can cause 
issues in flight. The utricle (one of the two otolith organs), for example, cannot 
distinguish between a tilting of the head and a linear acceleration. Therefore, under 
sustained forward acceleration, the utricle will provide the same signals to the brain that 
it would if the head was tilted backward under no acceleration [6]. Thus, the pilot may 
mistakenly perceive forward acceleration of his aircraft as an upward pitch (i.e. a 
backward tilt of the body/head/aircraft) and mistakenly pitch the aircraft down while in 
straight and level flight. 
Auditory Alarms 
 The auditory alert employed by the ASD was developed in recognition of the fact 
that the operational concept behind the Sperry-style AI is flawed. Specifically, its 
weakness is that it requires the pilot to periodically focus visual attention on the 
instrument to determine if their perception of attitude is correct. However, focusing on 
this instrument is a non-intuitive action for pilots because even if type I SD has set in, 
they have no reason to believe that their perceived attitude is false. Thus, there is no 
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reason to ensure that it is correct. Therefore the traditional AI violates Norman’s design 
principle of feedback since pilots have to actively seek feedback from the control 
movements that they input instead of feedback being provided to them in a way that is 
cognitively simple to perceive [7].  
 By permitting the pilot to communicate expected flight parameters to the system, 
the ASD automatically monitors the attitude of the aircraft and provides auditory alerts to 
the pilot whenever the attitude of the aircraft is outside the pilot’s expected flight 
parameters. These auditory alerts plausibly allow pilots to spend less time visually 
scanning their instruments and more time with their eyes outside of the cockpit, ensuring 
that their airspace is clear of hazards. Thus, the non-intuitive check of the traditional AI 
to ensure that a pilot is not suffering from SD is alleviated. This change may improve the 
pilot’s ability to become aware of spatial disorientation (i.e. transition quickly from type I 
to type II SD, or skip type I SD entirely) before it becomes a significant issue. 
 Aside from the common experiential knowledge that auditory alarms tend to 
capture our attention, there is some scholarly work on the subject. A primary advantage 
of auditory alarms over visual ones is that when we focus our visual attention, we 
typically see one specific item very clearly while our visual perception of non-attended 
items suffers. The auditory sense is quite different in that it is not as easily focused. As a 
result, we tend to hear certain auditory alerts even when we are not attending to them [8]. 
Therefore, human factors guidance often recommends that “if there is an alarm signal that 
must be sensed…it should be given an auditory form (although redundancy in the visual 
or tactile channel may be worthwhile)” [9].    
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 Unfortunately, this capture of attention can be undesirable. Alarms, which are 
intended to immediately induce focus from a pilot, may inadvertently disrupt their 
cognitive processing, distract them, and steal their attention from a potentially more 
important stimulus [8, 10]. This issue occurs in the cockpit as a result of the ever-
increasing number of ad-hoc auditory alarms and signals being implemented [11].  It is 
therefore possible that while the ASD’s auditory alarm may effectively capture the 
attention of pilots suffering from SD, it may also contribute to their confusion during 
times where many different auditory alarms may be sounding. 
Command Displays 
 In addition to the auditory alert, the ASD employs a visual command to the pilot 
(e.g. “pull up”), which informs him or her of the correct action to initiate return to 
straight and level flight. There have been a number of robust research efforts which 
compared status displays, which simply provide an alert that something has gone wrong, 
and command displays, which additionally provide information about actions that must 
be taken. The underlying theory is that decision making is split into three basic steps, “(1) 
acquiring and perceiving information or cues relevant for the decision, (2) generating and 
selecting hypotheses of situation assessments about what the cues mean,…[and] (3) 
planning and selecting choices to take” [9].  
 It has been hypothesized that command displays, such as the one found in the 
ASD significantly reduce or eliminate the time and cognitive effort needed to perform 
steps two and three [12]. The claim is that in high stress situations, such as an in-flight 
emergency, pilots experience a high temporal and cognitive demand. Therefore, the 
automation of this process can aid the pilot in returning his or her aircraft to the desired 
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orientation. Recognition-primed decision making could be happening when recovering 
from UAs if the pilot in question has been in similar situations [13]. As discussed above, 
the cognitive effort required to access long-term memory and compare the current 
situation to past experiences can take some time to perform. Command displays attempt 
to bypass that time by providing pilots with a decision instead of waiting for them to 
make their own. 
 These hypotheses were empirically tested using pilot response to simulated in-
flight icing of an aircraft. With the participation of 27 commercial pilots from the 
University of Illinois, pilot response time and accuracy to the first indication of icing 
when using either a status or command display was measured [12]. Additionally, the 
accuracy of information provided was manipulated to determine any effects of pilot trust 
or distrust in automation. A lack of reliability of automation can result in the user 
distrusting the automation. On the other hand, a very high reliability may cause the user 
to become complacent and not check the work of the automation. As a final caveat, 
humans are so unpredictable that they may display some form of mistrust, in which their 
trust level of the automation is not related to reliability at all [9]. 
  Pilots using the command display trended towards better performance in terms of 
response accuracy, though there was no significant effect of display type on response 
time. However, the most interesting results were the interactions between display type 
and information. Inaccurate information was linked to a much larger performance 
decrement in command displays than it was in status displays [12]. The experimenters 
appear to have validated their hypothesis that command aids help to eliminate decision-
making steps for the pilot. The larger performance decrement seems to indicate that pilots 
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are more likely to blindly follow the instructions of the command display while 
cognitively analyzing the status display before acting. Ostensibly, this blind following 
saves vital seconds in response time. Clearly, though, if the wrong instructions are 
presented to a blindly obedient pilot, the results may be catastrophic. 
 Importantly, in the realm of manned aviation, it has been shown that the use of 
aural commands may have the capability to dramatically aid the pilot in recovering from 
unusual attitudes. In a 2008 experiment, 12 U. S. Air Force fighter pilots were presented 
with unusual attitudes in an F-16 flight simulator. Experimental conditions varied the 
presence of certain attitude display aids, with the control condition utilizing only a 
standard heads-up display (HUD) and other experimental conditions using a command 
visual icon, the icon and an auditory command, or the icon and a tactile command. When 
pilots were given the auditory command aid, they were approximately 15% faster in 
leveling their wings under a moderate inversion (approximately 120° of roll, and varying 
pitch angles), and approximately 20% faster when under a severe inversion (approaching 
180° of roll, and varying pitch angles). Additionally, pilots input one quarter the number 
of incorrect control movements when using the auditory aid than when using the HUD 
only. Subjectively, 80% of the pilots who indicated preferring one aid over another 
selected the auditory commands as their most preferred aid [14].  
Attitude Indicator Graphical Layouts  
 The ASD’s graphical interface is also a point of interest. First, it employs a 
moving-aircraft symbol, stationary horizon (also known as outside-in) construct instead 
of the moving-horizon, stationary aircraft (also known as inside-out) construct of the 
Sperry-style AI. The selection between these two structures has been hotly debated since 
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before the Sperry Horizon was patented. In support of the moving-aircraft displays, the 
principle of the moving part is often cited. According to this principle, the best displays 
employ movement in a manner that accurately and intuitively represents that movement 
in reality. When the principle of the moving part is applied to the aviation domain, “one 
might say that when a pilot moves a control, he knows he is controlling his aircraft, not 
the outside world relative to his aircraft, and therefore he expects his aircraft symbols to 
move” [4]. Thus, this principle theoretically favors a moving-aircraft AI. 
 Interestingly, the argument is not entirely theoretical. There is a substantial body 
of research which indicates that inexperienced pilots learn to use the moving-aircraft 
display more quickly and that experienced pilots quickly achieve higher levels of 
performance when transitioning to the moving-aircraft display. In fact, in 1960, Donald 
Bauerschmidt and Stanley Roscoe simulated an air-to-air attack task and compared pilot 
performance on the two display types. Average steering errors calculated at the end of the 
task with the moving-aircraft display were approximately one fifth the size of those 
calculated with the moving-horizon display. Additionally, the pilots made approximately 
18 times the number of control reversals when using the moving-horizon display as they 
did when using the moving-aircraft display. Perhaps the most intriguing discussion point 
is that all of these results were found despite the fact that all participants’ flight 
experience had included the traditional moving-horizon display [15]. 
 The debate is not one-sided, however, and there are many advocates of the 
moving-horizon AI. Nearly all of them discredit the results of any experiment performed 
on the ground because the utility of the moving-horizon display, they claim, is only 
achieved in actual flight [16]. The validity of ground-based results can certainly be called 
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into question when researching a realm where airborne accelerations and the vestibular 
cues that they provide will no doubt influence the pilots’ perception of their orientation. 
In support of this, many cite Col. James Doolittle, who influenced the design of the 
Sperry Horizon. Doolittle claimed that the pilot and the aircraft function as one, and the 
pilot’s main frame of reference is indeed the aircraft [16]. This concept can be 
corroborated nearly verbatim in modern literature [6]. With this in mind, Doolittle 
claimed that since the real aircraft never moves with respect to the pilot, it makes no 
sense that the display’s aircraft symbol should move with respect to the pilot and thus 
requested that the Sperry Horizon employ a moving-horizon, stationary-aircraft construct 
[16].  
 Putting the debate to the test, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) took to 
the sky with each of 32 FAA-certified male pilots, a Beech T-34 military trainer, and a 
safety pilot. They performed an airborne experiment which compared the two types of 
displays in their ability to aid the pilot in recovering from UAs. In terms of bank angle 
recovery, pitch angle recovery, and number of control reversals, there were no overall 
trends that indicated either the moving-aircraft or moving-horizon indicator was superior. 
In general, it appeared that low-experience pilots tended towards better performance with 
the moving-aircraft AI while high-experience pilots tended towards better performance 
with the moving-horizon display. This effect held true when measuring the number of 
control reversals, with both groups performing at about the same level when using the 
moving-aircraft AI [16]. 
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Literature Summary 
 Based on this literature review, the ASD may offer a significant benefit in terms 
of enabling recovery from and/or preventing SD. First, it appears that command displays, 
such as those utilized in the ASD, in comparison to status displays utilized in traditional 
AIs, may decrease the time necessary for pilots to recover from UAs. Additionally, it is 
widely held that auditory alerts such as those employed by the ASD, are more effective at 
capturing attention than are visual signifiers such as those passively displayed by a 
traditional AI. Finally, the ASD’s moving-aircraft display, when compared to a 
traditional moving-horizon AI, has the potential to be effective in decreasing the time 
needed to respond to UAs and in decreasing the number of control reversals during 
recovery from them. Thus, the ASD merits further investigation and analysis. 
 While the combination of the ASD’s attributes is interesting, the current research 
was focused to understand the effect of the graphical depiction of aircraft attitude in the 
ASD as compared to the traditional AI. This limitation was due to unforeseen issues with 
auditory command lagging and the unavailability of a moving-based simulator. However, 
it is likely that the other attributes of the ASD, either singly or in combination will have 
benefit beyond those investigated within the current experiment.  Additionally, this study 
is intended to contribute to the general body of knowledge of AIs. Thus, through data 
analysis and a survey process, this study will unfold the utility of certain differences 
between the AI and the ASD. In so doing, the goal is to determine why various aspects of 
the ASD may or may not be beneficial to pilots. 
37 
Method 
Overview 
 A desktop computer based, non-moving flight simulator was used to compare the 
graphical depiction of the ASD to the traditional AI. Participants were selected from all 
flight experience levels and were asked to recover from already in-progress unusual 
attitudes in the flight simulation. Metrics such as the number of control errors, the time to 
complete recovery, and the root mean square error from perfect recovery were collected.  
Participants 
 Participants were 28 male Wright-Patterson Air Force Base personnel, ranging in 
age from 21 to 65 with a mean of 30. Previous flight experience ranged from 0 to 5000 
flight hours with a mean of 600 hours, and 0 to 2000 unmanned flight hours (including 
flight simulator, remotely piloted aircraft, and radio control aircraft) with a mean of 263 
hours. Of the 28 participants, 6 were instrument-rated pilots, 8 had experienced SD in 
flight, and 9 had undergone SD training. For the purpose of data analysis, participants 
were categorized based on their flight experience levels. There were 5 “experienced” 
pilots who had over 1000 hours of flight time, 9 “unmanned only” pilots who had no 
manned flight time, and 5 “total novice” participants who had no manned or unmanned 
flight experience. These were three separate binary categories with all 28 participants 
being categorized three times as either a member or non-member of each category. 
Apparatus 
 Flight simulation took place on a Hewlett-Packard Z820 workstation running X-
plane 10 Professional on a 30” Samsung Syncmaster 305T monitor. Manipulation of the 
simulated aircraft was accomplished with a Saitek X-52 joystick and throttle 
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combination. The software simulated an F-22 Raptor flying at 450 knots at 20,000 feet 
above ground level. 
 The ASD is shown in Figure 1, depicting a descending left turn. To interpret the 
display, participants were instructed to concern themselves only with pitch and bank. To 
determine their pitch, participants used the vertical scale in the center of the display. The 
green upside-down “V” symbol represented the nose of their aircraft and the thick white 
bar represented the horizon. Thus, when the “V” was above the white bar, they were 
pitched up and vice versa. To determine their bank, participants used the rounded scale 
occupying the uppermost portion of the display. The white aircraft symbol represented 
their aircraft. When this symbol was at the top of the rounded scale, the aircraft was 
straight and level. As participants banked left, the symbol would slide along the scale to 
the left, and vice versa. 
 
 
Figure 1(III). ASD Depicting a Descending Left Turn 
 
 The AI is shown in Figure 2, depicting the same descending left turn. To interpret 
the display, participants were instructed to concern themselves only with pitch and bank. 
To determine their pitch, participants used the vertical scale in the center of the display. 
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The black upside-down “V” symbol represented the nose of their aircraft and the thin 
white bar which separates the blue and brown areas represented the horizon. The blue 
area represented the sky and the brown area represented the ground. Thus, when the “V” 
was above the white bar, the simulated aircraft was pitched up and vice versa. To 
determine their bank, participants either referenced the horizon bar to ensure that it was 
completely horizontal, or used the rounded scale occupying the uppermost portion of the 
display. The white arrow on this scale always points directly towards the sky. When this 
arrow was at the top of the rounded scale, the aircraft was straight and level. As 
participants banked left, the symbol would slide along the scale to the right, as shown in 
Figure 2, and vice versa. 
 
 
 
Figure 2(III). AI Depicting a Descending Left Turn 
 
Procedure 
 After giving informed consent and completing a demographic survey, participants 
read an instruction document which explained the tasks they were to perform. The two 
displays (AI and ASD) were explained in detail to the participant and any necessary 
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clarifications were made. Participants were given instruction on how to best interpret the 
two displays, but not on specific recovery techniques. The participant was then free to fly 
the simulator with the first display (one of two within-subjects conditions) for up to ten 
minutes. This free-fly session was used to familiarize the participants with the controls, 
the display, and the behavior of the simulated aircraft. Next, two practice trials were 
performed to familiarize participants with the task. In each trial, participants were placed 
in an already in-flight situation. In each situation, the simulated aircraft was started in one 
of six unusual pitch/bank attitudes. These attitudes included three levels of bank 
(moderate bank of 45°, moderate inversion of 120°, and severe inversion of 165°) and 
two levels of pitch (moderate pitch 30°, and severe pitch of 60°). A list of the individual 
starting orientations can be found in Appendix E.  
 Participants had no visual reference except for the display being used, which 
occupied a 3” by 3” square on the otherwise black screen. This was intended to simulate 
a pilot who was experiencing SD and, in accordance with his training, was focusing 
solely on his instruments to regain his perception of orientation. Participants began each 
trial looking at an entirely black screen, with their hand neutral on the joystick. On the 
experimenter’s command “ready, go!”, the simulation was unpaused, the first display 
being used appeared on the screen, and the participant began the task of returning the 
aircraft to straight and level flight (+/- 5° of pitch, +/- 10° of bank). Once the simulated 
aircraft stayed within these parameters for at least 2 seconds, the trial was terminated. 
After two practice trials and six experimental trials, the second display was explained in 
detail and the entire process was repeated.  
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Experimental Design 
 Demographics collected via survey were age, gender, manned and unmanned 
flight hours logged, previous instrument ratings, previous experience of SD in flight, and 
previous SD training. The only independent variables which were manipulated were the 
display being used, and the order of displays used within-subjects. The order of displays 
used was alternated between participants to avoid any practice effect which might 
increase performance on the second display used. However, it is acknowledged that the 
trained pilots had significant experience and training using the traditional AI, training 
beyond that received by any participant using the ASD. The counterbalancing of order 
was also performed to minimize the perception that the ASD was “new and/or improved” 
while the AI was “old technology”.  
 The order of situations was counterbalanced to minimize any learning effect from 
one display to the next.  With the first display, participants went through situations 1-6 in 
numerical order. With the second display, situations 2 and 3 were swapped with 
situations 5 and 6. This difference in order was applied to reduce the likelihood that 
participants would predict the next situation based on the experience they had with the 
first display. This particular arrangement was chosen because it did not alter the order of 
severity of banks/pitches and thus allowed analysis to be performed regarding each 
display’s performance in varying unusual attitude severities.  
 Dependent variables included time to complete recovery, RMS error of recovery, 
and initial control error count. After the end of an experimental session, the data was 
analyzed in Microsoft Excel to calculate these variables. The program used in Excel 
allowed the experimenter to see the elapsed time of the simulation at a precision of one 
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tenth of a second, the simulated aircraft’s pitch and bank at a precision of one hundredth 
of a degree, as well as the participant’s joystick inputs at a precision of one hundredth of 
a percent. To determine time to recovery, the experimenter found the first instance that 
the aircraft’s pitch and bank was within the acceptable tolerances for straight and level 
flight (+/- 5° of pitch, +/- 10° of bank) for at least two seconds. The beginning of this two 
second portion was recorded as the recovery time. To tally initial control errors, the 
experimenter determined whether the participant made the initial joystick input in the 
correct direction of bank (i.e. a left input for right banks and vice versa). An initial 
control error was recorded when the participant made a control input of 10% or more in 
the incorrect direction for any length of time or a control input of 5% or more in the 
incorrect direction for at least two tenths of a second. These criteria were adopted to 
prevent misclassification of any unintended stick movements. 
 A post-experimental survey was used to elicit participant’s subjective thoughts 
towards each display and is shown in Appendix C. These included preference of one 
display over the other, the perceived best and worst aspects of each display, the ease of 
learning how to use each display (with a 5-point rating scale), the strategies used, whether 
either display was misinterpreted during the trials, and any recommended improvements. 
The goal of these survey items was to provide some background for effects seen in the 
experimental data. For instance, if participants communicated that one display was more 
preferred and easier to use, there would be an expectation that performance in the 
experiment would be superior with this display. Also, if one display performed poorly, 
survey responses indicating frequent misinterpretations and complicated strategy for 
using this display may explain the poor performance. 
43 
Data Cleaning 
 It was noted that in the unusual attitudes that included an upwards pitch, there was 
a large difference in recovery technique between experienced and novice participants. 
Novice pilots tended to push the stick forward to bring the nose of the aircraft to the 
horizon. Experienced pilots avoided this technique as  it would incur negative Gz forces, 
which would cause the pilot to rise out of the seat and press against the seatbelts, 
potentially reducing the pilots’ ability to control the aircraft. Because of this varying 
technique, recovery times and RMS values differed greatly for reasons that had nothing 
to do with the effect of the display. Thus, all upward pitched situations were excluded 
from data analysis. Additionally, one participant lost control of the aircraft during several 
recoveries and was excluded as an outlier. 
Results 
Preference 
 In terms of preference of one display over the other, approximately 26% (7) of the 
participants preferred the ASD over the traditional AI. Although this is a relatively low 
proportion, it is an impressive finding since nearly all of the participants had some level 
of prior experience with the AI, none of them had experience with the ASD, and 
participants were instructed to select the display they would fly a real aircraft with if they 
had the option. In fact the most experienced participant to prefer the ASD had 850 actual 
flight hours with the AI. However, as previous flight experience increased, preference for 
ASD generally decreased, as expected.  In fact, 81.8% of those who had manned or 
unmanned flight experience preferred the AI, as shown in Table 1. Thus, the odds of 
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preferring the AI were 6.75 times higher for those with some experience than for those 
with none. However this effect only neared statistical significance (χ2(1, 27) = 3.710, 
p=0.0541). 
Table 1(III). Contingency Table of ASD Preference by Novice Status 
 
 AI Preferred ASD Preferred Total 
Non-Novice 18 4 22 
Novice 2 3 5 
Total 20 7 27 
 
Ease of Learning 
 Participants used a 5-point rating scale to indicate how easy it was to quickly 
become confident using the ASD, the majority of participants (10) chose “easy”. The 
majority of participants (17) chose “very easy” in response to the same question with the 
AI. When coded numerically with -2 representing “very easy” and +2 representing “very 
hard”, the ASD mean response was -0.48 and the AI mean response was -1.41. The 
average difference in responses was therefore 0.93 lower (i.e. easier) for the AI. A 
Wilcoxon signed rank test revealed that the AI (Mdn = -2) was rated as easier to learn 
than the ASD (Mdn = -1), z = 2.19, p = 0.0285, r = -0.287. This rating difference ranged 
from 4 higher (i.e. harder) with the ASD to 3 higher with the AI. All of these results were 
expected since the majority of participants had already learned how to use the AI but 
were unfamiliar with the ASD. With these facts in mind, it is noteworthy that more than 
one third of the participants found the ASD at least as easy to learn as the AI, and 20% 
found it easier to learn than the AI. 
 
45 
Time to Recovery  
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the starting 
orientation had a significant main effect on the time to recovery, F(2, 25) = 15.09, p < 
0.0001. This was an expected main effect since the more drastic unusual attitudes started 
participants far from straight and level flight and required longer duration control inputs 
to recover than the less extreme starting attitudes. Display type also had a significant 
main effect on time to recovery, F(1,25) = 15.03, p = 0.0007. Participants averaged 7.89 
seconds to recover the aircraft using the ASD and 5.97 seconds using the AI, as shown in 
Figure 3. The average time difference was therefore 1.92 seconds faster with the AI. As 
expected, there was a significant interaction between the presence of flight experience 
and display type, F(1, 25) = 10.41, p = 0.0035. Because of their previous use of the AI, 
participants with flight experience completed the recovery task an average of 2.78 
seconds faster with the AI than with the ASD, while participants with no flight 
experience were an average of 0.22 seconds faster with the AI that with the ASD.  
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Figure 3(III). Bar Graph of Flight Experience and Display Type Interaction Effect on 
Time to Recover 
 
Root Mean Square Error 
 The root mean square (RMS) error from 0° of pitch and bank was calculated for 
each recovery, with lower values indicating a more accurate (i.e. less deviation from 
perfect) recovery. An ANOVA showed that the starting orientation of the simulated 
aircraft had a significant main effect on RMS error, F(2, 25) = 126.84, p < 0.0001. This 
finding was expected since the RMS values were dependent on deviations from 0° of 
pitch and bank. Thus, the more severe unusual attitudes necessitated higher RMS values 
regardless of recovery time or accuracy. Flight experience levels had no statistically 
significant effect on RMS error. Participants averaged 72.27 degree*seconds with the 
ASD and 69.20 degree*seconds with the AI. The average RMS difference was therefore 
3.07 lower with the AI. However, there was no statistically significant effect of display 
type on RMS error. 
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Initial Control Error Count 
 It was postulated that one of the two display symbologies might allow pilots to 
more accurately determine their orientation at a glance, and therefore produce fewer 
errors in the initial recovery process. Thus, the number of initial bank errors was 
calculated for each participant. In other words, if the participant should have banked left 
to achieve the quickest recovery but banked right instead, this was coded as an initial 
control error. An ANOVA reported that there was a significant three-way interaction 
effect between display type, order of displays used, and starting orientation, F(2, 50) = 
4.49, p = 0.0161. This interaction can be seen in the large differences between Figures 4 
and 5. A potential explanation for this effect lies in the counterbalancing scheme used for 
the starting orientations. One of the two orders had participants engaged in a severe 
inversion before the less severe orientations, while the other increased in severity with 
each trial. Since the majority of participants had been previously exposed to the AI, any 
learning effect present would have been more drastic when the ASD was being used. It is 
likely that those who both used the AI first and had the building severity situations had 
the maximum amount of time to learn how to best interpret the ASD and complete the 
tasks. Those who either used the ASD first or had the initially severe situations had less 
time to learn before being tested by the severe inversion and thus committed more errors. 
A description of all the situations and their associated numbers and orders can be found 
in Appendix E. Interestingly, none of the two-way interactions involving these variables 
were statistically significant. Participants averaged 0.26 errors per trial with the ASD and 
0.48 errors per trial with the AI. The average error count difference was therefore 0.22 
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more errors per trial with the AI. However, display type did not have a significant effect 
on the number of errors made. 
 
Figure 4(III). Bar Graph of Situation Number and Display Type when ASD was the First 
Display 
 
 
Figure 5(III). Bar Graph of Situation Number and Display Type when AI was the First 
Display 
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Open-Ended Survey Items 
 With the aim of generalizing this study beyond a single piece of technology, 
several survey items asked participants to share their qualitative thoughts on the two 
displays. These responses, both from novice participants and more experienced pilots, 
were intended to elucidate general attitude display characteristics or features which may 
be favorable to a pilot. It is important to note that many of these responses simply suggest 
incorporating some aspects of the AI into the ASD. This bias toward AI features is likely 
due to many participants having previous experience with the AI. Since total novices had 
no prior experience, their responses were noted below. Only those recommendations 
which were mentioned by at least three participants are included. 
Recommended ASD Improvements 
 One survey item asked participants to recommend improvements to the ASD. Ten 
of the 28 participants (including four of the six total novices) recommended that the ASD 
distinguish upward and downward pitch using a color scheme such as the AI’s blue sky 
and brown ground concept. One of these participants additionally noted that color 
distinction is not the only available method. This participant suggested angling pitch bars 
away from the horizon so that pilots would understand their direction of pitch based on 
the angle of the bars. Four participants (zero novices) suggested that the ASD’s zero-
pitch bar be extended across the display to form a horizon line. They did not recommend 
a moving-horizon display, but simply a longer line. Three participants (including one 
novice) believed that the ASD was too cluttered and advised that it be simplified. Three 
participants (zero novices) did not want to look at two separate pieces of the display to 
determine their pitch and bank. They believed that pilots should be able to determine both 
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pieces of information in a single glance at the display. Ostensibly, this would decrease the 
necessary visual search and fixation time and cognitive effort necessary to comprehend 
the display.  
ASD Best Features 
 Participants were asked to list what they viewed as the best features of the ASD. 
Fourteen of the 28 participants listed the visual commands (including three of the six total 
novices) as being helpful in quickly comprehending the correct control input. Five 
participants (including one novice) found the tail-view bank symbol at the top of the ASD 
to be intuitive in determining bank direction. Five more participants (including one 
novice) were partial to the bank indicator wedge for quickly comprehending bank 
direction. Four participants (zero novices) cited the use of different colors to 
communicate urgency to the pilot as being beneficial in commanding attention. Finally, 
three participants (including one novice) listed the ASD’s stationary background as being 
superior to the AI’s motion. 
AI Best Features 
 Participants were also asked to list what they viewed as the best features of the 
AI. Fifteen of the 28 participants (including four of the six total novices) cited the use of 
color to distinguish pitch direction (blue sky and brown ground) as a beneficial AI 
feature. Nine participants (including four novices) found the simplicity of the AI to be its 
best attribute. Five participants (including one novice) appreciated the horizon line used 
to represent zero pitch in the AI. Three participants (including one novice) noted that the 
AI’s “sky-pointer” arrow helped them determine their orientation. Finally, in support of 
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the aforementioned bias towards features from the AI, four participants (zero novices) 
admitted that their familiarity with the AI was the aspect they found most appealing. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 This study was designed to determine if the graphical representation provided by 
the AI or ASD more intuitively communicated orientation in 3-D space to the pilot. The 
goal was to see if a pilot who was attending to his instruments would be able to more 
quickly and accurately return to straight and level flight with one of these two displays. It 
was found that participants recovered about 2 seconds faster with the traditional AI than 
with the ASD, on average. Participants also rated the AI as significantly easier to learn 
than the ASD. However, it should be noted that nearly all of the participants came into 
this study already having at least some experience with the AI and thus would be 
expected to perform better with it. With that in mind, it is interesting to see the effect of 
number of flight hours on recovery times. More experienced participants tended to 
perform better with the AI while less experienced participants tended to perform better 
with the ASD. Manned flight experience accounted for over 30% of the variation in 
recovery times.  
 While RMS error and initial error count comparisons yielded non-significant 
results, participants had lower RMS values with the AI yet higher error counts with the 
AI. The lower number of errors seen in the ASD may be due, in part, to its use of a visual 
command display. The ASD textually displayed the correct initial control action to the 
participants, while the AI left it up to the participants to decide on their own. While there 
are inherent drawbacks to the use or non-use of these commands, they may well be the 
52 
reason for the fewer ASD errors. Performance aside, over 25% of participants preferred 
the ASD over the AI. This is an interesting fact considering the lack of experience with 
the ASD at the outset of the study. 
 Open-ended survey responses yielded results with potential for generalization to 
other attitude displays. The main theme behind the responses was that quick and accurate 
comprehension was the single most important factor to the displays perceived 
effectiveness. Participants noted that the use of colors, words, and symbols can all be 
used in various manners to achieve this speed and accuracy. For example, the AI used 
blue and brown colors to distinguish current pitch direction, while the ASD used textual 
messages to communicate the correct control input. When deciding how to combine this 
possibilities effectively, it is important to remember that simplicity was mentioned many 
times as a key aspect to display design. While rich information can be helpful during 
times of low workload, designers should temper the urge to provide extra informational 
stimuli with the knowledge that pilots may be viewing these displays in less than ideal 
circumstances, such as when suffering from SD. 
 It should be noted that the main advantage of the ASD may not be in unusual 
attitude recovery. The intent behind the ASD design is to aid the pilot by alerting the pilot 
and drawing his or her attention to the instruments in certain SD-inducing situations. That 
being said, eliminating SD entirely is a difficult task which may not be possible for a 
single instrument. Therefore, it is important that the symbology and alerting systems be 
laid out in a way that allows for quick and accurate recovery from unusual attitudes. To 
further test the claim that the ASD may eliminate or minimize the actual occurrence of 
SD, future research should be performed in a high-fidelity simulator. If a moving-base 
53 
simulator was used, the vestibular and visual inputs which cause or increase the 
likelihood of SD could be portrayed. This could allow the pilot’s actions and performance 
to be tracked with each display during the possible inception of SD and the researcher 
could see if one display caused pilots to be disoriented while the other did not. 
 Since fiscal year 1993, there have been 72 SD Class A mishaps in the Air Force 
which have claimed 101 lives and 65 aircraft for a total cost of $2.32 billion [2]. It has 
been hypothesized that the current technology may be one of the many factors 
contributing to this deadly trend. This study set out to determine whether the newly 
proposed ASD permits the pilot to return their aircraft to level flight more easily and 
efficiently than the traditional AI. Ultimately, the AI had faster recovery times and lower 
RMS error values. However, it is important to note that fewer initial control errors were 
made with the ASD. Additionally, experienced pilots in this study believed the ASD has 
potential in the field of SD minimization and mitigation. Several of these went so far as 
to say that they would prefer to fly with the ASD despite their years of experience with 
the AI. Additionally, over half of the participants used the ASD’s visual commands in 
their recovery strategies and found them to be helpful. With the huge costs of SD to the 
Air Force, in terms of dollars, aircraft, and lives, the ASD merits further investigation as 
a potential path to a safer future. 
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter will draw general conclusions which merge the two scholarly 
articles, describe the significance of their findings, recommend actions that can be taken 
as a result of this research, and discuss future research that should be done to build upon 
this manuscript. 
Conclusions of Research 
 In chapter II, it was determined that while SD-related mishaps accounted for a 
relatively small number of the Class A mishaps, SD-related mishaps are often 
catastrophic, being much more likely to result in loss of life, loss of aircraft, and larger 
than average monetary losses than the other Class A mishaps. SD-related mishaps 
accounted for 12% of the Class A mishaps but accounted for more than 34% of the fatal 
mishaps, 25% of the lost lives, 17% of the lost aircraft and 17% of the monetary losses 
from Class A mishaps. Overall, this study demonstrated that the normalization of mishap 
data by flight hours rather than number of flights can result in different interpretations of 
the existing mishap data.  Further, this study emphasizes the fact that SD remains a 
significant issue for military aviation, especially for helicopter and fighter/attack aircraft.  
Perhaps surprisingly, this finding applies equally regardless of whether the fighter/attack 
aircraft includes a single crew member or a pair of crew members. 
 Chapter III analyzed the proposed ASD as a display intended to mitigate or avoid 
the effects of SD. This display differed from the traditional AI through a new graphical 
depiction of attitude, auditory cues which alert the pilot to incipient SD, and visual 
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commands which instruct the pilot in recovery to level flight. According to the current 
literature which was summarized in chapter III, it appears that command displays such as 
those utilized in the ASD, in comparison to status displays utilized in traditional AIs, may 
decrease the cognitive workload and time necessary for pilots to recover from UAs. 
Additionally, it is widely held that auditory alerts such as those employed by the ASD, 
are more effective at capturing attention than are visual signifiers such as those passively 
displayed by a traditional AI. Finally, the ASD’s moving-aircraft display has the potential 
to be effective in decreasing the time needed to respond to UAs and in decreasing the 
number of control reversals during recovery for novices. Thus, the ASD merits further 
investigation and analysis. 
 While the combination of the ASD’s attributes is interesting, the current research 
was focused to understand the effect of the graphical depiction of aircraft attitude in the 
ASD as compared to the traditional AI. This limitation was due to unforeseen issues with 
auditory command lagging, the unavailability of a moving-based simulator, and the lack 
of willing participants who had no prior knowledge of the AI. However, it is likely that 
the other attributes of the ASD, either singly or in combination will have benefit beyond 
those investigated within the current experiment.  Additionally, this study was intended to 
contribute to the general body of knowledge of AIs. Thus, through data analysis and a 
survey process, this study attempted to unfold the utility of certain differences between 
the AI and the ASD. In so doing, the goal was to determine why various aspects of the 
ASD may or may not be beneficial to pilots. 
 In chapter III, it was found that the AI ultimately had faster recovery times and 
lower RMS error values across the entire pool of participants. However, it is important to 
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note that fewer initial control errors were made with the ASD. Participants also rated the 
AI as significantly easier to learn than the ASD. However, it should be noted that nearly 
all of the participants came into this study already having at least some experience with 
the AI and thus would be expected to perform better with it. With that in mind, it is 
interesting to see the effect of number of flight hours on recovery times. More 
experienced participants tended to perform better with the AI while less experienced 
participants tended to perform better with the ASD. Finally, experienced pilots in this 
study saw ASD as having potential in the field of SD minimization and mitigation and 
over half of the participants stated that they used the ASD’s visual commands in their 
recovery strategies and found them to be helpful. Two of these went so far as to say that 
they would prefer to fly with the ASD despite their years of experience with the AI.  
Significance of Research 
 SD has posed a significant problem to the AF since the advent of aviation and 
continues to do so today. SD mishaps have cost the AF more than 2 billion dollars and 
more than 100 lives over the past two decades. In addition to being extremely expensive, 
SD is poorly understood and often fatal. This thesis research hoped to make strides in 
achieving better comprehension of SD by determining which conditions have been highly 
correlated with SD occurrence. As a result of the findings in chapter II, it is now apparent 
that helicopter and fighter/attack platforms tend to be more prone to SD mishaps. 
Furthermore, this research aimed to contribute to the body of knowledge of attitude 
displays which may inhibit or mitigate the effects of SD. As a result of the findings in 
chapter III, it was shown that the current graphical depiction of the AI may facilitate fast 
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recovery, but also allow more initial control errors to occur than an alternate graphical 
depiction. Using the knowledge gained through this research, and from future stimulated 
research, aviation communities worldwide could benefit by the added knowledge 
presented in this document. 
Recommendations for Action 
 It is clear that future efforts to reduce SD mishaps should focus on helicopters and 
fighter/attack aircraft as SD mishaps are 5 times more likely per flight hour in these 
platforms than in others.  Furthermore, there is a need to update the AFSAS database to 
capture the use of NVGs in addition to the use of soon to be implemented devices 
including HMDs. This would allow any effect of these technologies on SD mishaps to be 
evaluated in future studies.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
 To further test the claim that the ASD may eliminate or minimize the actual 
occurrence of SD, future research should be performed in a high-fidelity simulator. If a 
moving-base simulator was used, the vestibular and visual inputs which cause or increase 
the likelihood of SD could be portrayed. This could allow the pilot’s actions and 
performance to be tracked with each display during the possible inception of SD and the 
researcher could see if one display caused pilots to be disoriented while the other did not. 
 Additionally, a similar experiment to the one detailed in chapter III should be 
performed using only truly novice participants who have had no previous interaction with 
the AI. A larger sample, using only these participants, would allow more robust claims to 
be made with regard to the ASD and AI comparison. This experiment, or combination of 
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experiments, should also seek to test the other aspects of the ASD which may inhibit or 
mitigate the effects of SD.  For example, participants could perform some distraction task 
while their simulated aircraft is supposed to be flying straight and level. During this time, 
the simulation could be made to cause deviations from straight and level flight which 
would trigger the ASD’s auditory alert/command and draw the participant’s attention to 
the display. This scenario would aid in testing the ASD’s true intended utility in avoiding 
incipient SD altogether. 
Summary 
 It has long been known that SD is a dangerous situation in flight which can cause 
mishaps and that aircraft are outfitted with certain technology used to prevent and recover 
from SD. This thesis research revealed just how costly, destructive, and fatal SD has been 
over the past two decades and attempted to further the cause of SD avoidance and 
mitigation by evaluating a proposed non-traditional display. It is hoped that this work will 
give rise to invigorated discussion and research with regard to SD and that the 
conclusions drawn in this manuscript and in future works will save dollars, aircraft, and 
lives. 
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Appendix A: Sample Participant Instruction Sheet 
 
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircraft Attitude Indicator 
 
Instructions 
1. Thank you for choosing to participate in this study, your participation should take no 
longer than one hour. In this study, we are attempting to compare two aircraft attitude 
displays using a flight simulator. These are shown below, each depicting a descending 
left turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. You will be given the opportunity to “free fly” the simulator for up to 10 minutes with 
the aircraft that will be used in the experimental trials. You are free to ask any questions 
about the two systems, the aircraft, or the simulation during the “free fly” period or 
during the practice trials. 
 
Next, we will begin with two practice trials and six experimental trials with each display. In each 
of these trials, you will be presented with an already in-progress, in-flight situation. In every 
situation, you will be flying a simulated F-22 Raptor at approximately 20,000 feet above ground 
level, at approximately 350 knots indicated airspeed (400mph). The only thing that will change 
with each situation is your aircraft’s attitude in space (i.e. its pitch and roll). Before each trial, the 
screen will be blank and I will say “ready, Go!”, after hearing this your task is to recover the 
aircraft to straight and level flight as quickly as possible and maintain straight and level flight for 
at least two seconds. Straight and level flight is defined as 0° of pitch (+/- 5°), and 0° of roll (+/- 
10°). The trial will end if this attitude is maintained for at least 2 seconds, if the aircraft crashes, 
or if 60 seconds elapse. The throttle will be set at ½ throttle and you should not need to adjust it. 
There is no rudder control or trim.                                                 
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Appendix B: Demographic Survey 
 
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircraft Attitude Indicator 
 
Demographic Survey 
Participant #: 
Age: 
Gender: 
Total approximate flight time logged (hours): 
 
Total approximate unmanned flight time logged (Radio Control, RPA, or simulator): 
 
Have you ever been an instrument rated pilot? Please describe your instrument rating. 
 
 
Do you have any history of visual or vestibular abnormalities (i.e. problems with vision or 
balance)? 
Please explain. 
 
 
Have you undergone any sort of spatial disorientation training or studied spatial disorientation? 
Please describe what the training/studying was like, including who it was provided by and its 
duration. 
 
 
Have you ever experienced spatial disorientation in flight? 
Please describe any experiences you have had, including both acute one-time occurrences and 
chronic every-flight occurrences. 
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Appendix C: Post-Experimental Survey 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircaft Attitude Indicator 
 
Learnability/Preference Survey 
Participant #: 
Which display did you prefer? (circle one) 
 
What are the best aspects of the display on the left? (most helpful, useful, appealing, etc.) 
 
 
What are the best aspects of the display on the right? (most helpful, useful, appealing, etc.) 
 
 
How easy was it for you to quickly feel confident using the display on the right? Mark the scale 
below with an X. 
-2                                -1                                 0                                  1                                 2 
 
 
Comments: 
Very 
Easy 
Easy Neither Easy 
Nor Hard 
Hard Very 
Hard 
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How easy was it for you to quickly feel confident using the display on the left? Mark the scale 
below with an X. 
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
Did you utilize the visual commands (i.e. “bank left”) with the display on the right?  
If so, how helpful were they? Mark the scale below with an X 
 
 
 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
Did you ever misinterpret the display on the left? If yes, how so?. 
 
 
 
 
Very 
Harmful 
Neither Helpful 
Nor Harmful 
Harmful Helpful Very 
Helpful 
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Did you ever misinterpret the display on the right? If yes, how so? 
 
 
 
 
What was your strategy in completing the tasks with the display on the left? How did this differ 
from your strategy with the display on the right? 
 
 
 
 
How could the display on the right be improved? 
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Appendix D: Informed Consent Document 
 
 
 
Informed Consent Document 
For 
Evaluation of a Non-Traditional Aircraft Attitude Indicator  
AFIT/ENV 
 
 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Michael Miller, (937) 255-3636 ext. 4651, AFIT/ENV  
Michael.Miller@afit.edu 
 
 
Associate Investigators: 2Lt Robert Poisson, (508) 212-5902, AFIT/ENV  
Robert.Poisson@afit.edu 
 
1. Nature and purpose:  You have been offered the opportunity to participate in the 
“Evaluation of a Multi-Sensory, Moving-Aircraft, Customizable Attitude Indicator” research 
study.  Your participation will occur at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Building 640, 
Room 340. 
 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate a proposed aircraft attitude indicator, termed the 
Attitude Stabilization Display (ASD) The time requirement for each volunteer subject is 
anticipated to be a total of 1 visit of approximately 1 hour.  A total of approximately 30 
subjects will be enrolled in this study. 
 
2. Experimental procedures:  If you decide to participate, the procedures you will be using are 
detailed in the “Instructions” document.  
 
3. Discomfort and risks:  Discomforts may consist of any discomfort normally associated with 
sitting at a computer for an hour such as back aches or fatigued eyes. Additional discomfort 
may include those associated with using a stationary desktop flight simulator such as 
dizziness or nausea. Potential risks include is the disclosure of individual responses or private 
information, which will be mitigated by maintaining anonymous surveys and collecting them 
in unsupervised, yet secure, receptacles located in AFIT laboratory/classroom space.  In 
addition, observations will not record personally identifiable information so that performance 
data cannot be tied to specific individuals.  Another risk is the possibility of reinforcing 
negative training during the accomplishment of simulated unusual attitude recovery.  This 
risk will be mitigated by providing instruction only regarding how to understand the AI 
systems that will be presented, not regarding how to actually perform recovery procedures.  
 
4. Benefits: You are not expected to benefit directly from participation in this research study. 
 
5. Compensation:  If you are active duty military you will receive your normal active duty pay.  
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1. Alternatives:  Your alternative is to choose not to participate in this study.  Refusal to 
participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which 
you are otherwise entitled.  Notify one of the investigators of this study to discontinue. 
 
8. Entitlements and confidentiality:   
  
a. Records of your participation in this study may only be disclosed according to federal 
law, including the Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, and its implementing regulations 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and its 
implementing regulations, when applicable, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 
U.S.C. Sec 552, and its implementing regulations when applicable.  Your personal 
information will be stored in a locked cabinet in an office that is locked when not 
occupied.  Electronic files containing your personal information will be password 
protected and stored only on a secure server. Additionally, all surveys are anonymous and 
are collected in unsupervised, yet secure, receptacles located in AFIT 
laboratory/classroom space.  In addition, observations will not record personally 
identifiable information so that performance data cannot be tied to specific individuals.  It 
is intended that the only people having access to your information will be the researchers 
named above and this study’s Medical Monitor or Consultant, the AFRL Wright Site 
IRB, the Air Force Surgeon General’s Research Compliance office, the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering office or any other IRB involved in the review and 
approval of this protocol. When no longer needed (after March 2014) for research 
purposes your information will be destroyed in a secure manner (shredding)  Complete 
confidentiality cannot be promised, in particular for military personnel, whose health or 
fitness for duty information may be required to be reported to appropriate medical or 
command authorities.  If such information is to be reported, you will be informed of what 
is being reported and the reason for the report. 
 
b. Your entitlements to medical and dental care and/or compensation in the event of injury 
are governed by federal laws and regulations, and that if you desire further information 
you may contact the base legal office (ASC/JA, 257-6142 for Wright-Patterson AFB).   
 
The decision to participate in this research is completely voluntary on your part.  No one may 
coerce or intimidate you into participating in this program.  Participate only if you want to, 2Lt 
Robert Poisson or an associate, has adequately answered any and all questions you have about 
this study, your participation, and the procedures involved.  If you have any further questions, 
2Lt Robert Poisson can be reached at (508) 212-5902.  2Lt Robert Poisson, or an associate will 
be available to answer any questions concerning procedures throughout this study.  If significant 
new findings develop during the course of this research, which may relate to your decision to 
continue participate or may affect the risk involved, you will be informed.  Refusal to participate 
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  You may 
discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherwise entitled.  Notify one of the investigators of this study to discontinue.  Additionally, the 
investigator may  
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c. terminate your participation in this study if she or he feels this to be in your best interest.  
If you have any questions or concerns about your participation in this study or your rights 
as a research subject, please contact Col William Butler at (937) 656 – 5436 or 
william.butler2@wpafb.af.mil.  
 
d. Your participation in this study may be filmed or audio/videotaped.  The purpose of these 
recordings is for accurate data analysis. Only the experimenters listed above will use 
recording of your flight to match quantitative data to qualitative flight simulation 
decisions that you made in order to ensure that the data and our understanding of it match 
reality.  
  
YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE. YOUR 
SIGNATURE INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING 
READ THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE. 
  
Volunteer Signature_________________________________________Date_______________ 
  
Volunteer Name (printed)_________________________________________ 
  
Advising Investigator Signature  ______________________ Date _________________ 
  
Investigator Name (printed)_________________________________________ 
 
Witness Signature __________________________________Date _________________ 
 
Witness Name (printed)_________________________________________ 
 
 
We may wish to present some of the video/audio recordings from this study at scientific 
conventions or use photographs in journal publications.  If you consent to the use of your image 
for publication or presentation in a scientific or academic setting, please sign below. 
 
Volunteer Signature_________________________________________Date_______________ 
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Appendix E: List of Unusual Attitudes Used 
1
st
 Display. 
Situation 1: 30 degrees up, 45 degrees right 
Situation 2: 30 degrees down, 120 degrees left 
Situation 3: 60 degrees up, 165 degrees right 
Situation 4: 60 degrees down, 45 degrees left 
Situation 5: 30 degrees up, 120 degrees right 
Situation 6: 60 degrees down, 165 degrees left 
2
nd
 Display. 
Situation 1 
Situation 5 
Situation 6 
Situation 4 
Situation 3 
Situation 2 
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